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Abstract
This paper examines a model where the set of available outcomes from which a decision maker
must choose alters his perception of uncertainty. Specifically, this paper proposes a set of axioms
such that each menu induces a subjective belief over an objective state space. The decision maker’s
preferences are dependent on the realization of the state. The resulting representation is analogous
to state-dependent expected utility within each menu; the beliefs are menu dependent and the
utility index is not. Under the interpretation that a menu acts as an informative signal regarding
the true state, the paper examines the behavioral restrictions that coincide with different signal
structures: elemental (where each element of a menu is a conditionally independent signal) and
partitional (where the induced beliefs form a partition of the state space).
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1 Introduction
Both intuition and psychological evidence insist that a decision maker’s (DM’s) preference over alternatives
is affected by the environment in which the decision is made (Kahneman and Tversky, 1984; Simonson
and Tversky, 1992; Sen, 1993). While there are many external factors that potentially exert influence on
the decision making process, this paper examines a model in which the set of alternatives that is currently
available acts as a frame –a process often differentiated from general framing effects under the moniker context
dependence. I identify the behavioral conditions for context dependent beliefs, when the DM’s subjective
assessment of the likelihood of events depends on the available alternatives (the menu) from which he must
choose, and consider additional restrictions that correspond to particular subjective information structures.
Context dependence is often associated with notions of bounded rationality or psychological heuristics
Tversky and Simonson (1993). This paper, however, interprets menu-induced framing as rational, exploring
how and when such behavior exists within the subjective expected utility paradigm. If the DM believes the
menu itself contains information regarding payoff relevant uncertainty, conditioning his preference on such
information is a rational action. Specifically, the model assumes the payoff associated with each alternative
is ex-ante uncertain. The DM’s utility from consumption depends not only on the chosen outcome, but also
on which state of the world is realized. The DM, before consumption, is uncertain about the state of the
world, but holds a belief (a probability distribution) over the state space; in a given decision problem, the
DM maximizes his expected utility according to his belief. When the DM interprets the current selection
of alternatives as a signal about the state of the world, his preferences will change across different decision
problems in response to his updated beliefs.
Before expounding the finer points of the model, it is worth considering two examples to better illustrate
why menu dependent preferences are indeed necessary to explain many decision making scenarios.
Example 1.A (Luce and Raiffa’s diner). On a first date, Katya finds herself in a restaurant at which she
has previously never eaten, and which offers chicken (c) or steak (s). She states her strict preference for
chicken (c ą s). However, upon seeing the restaurant also serves frog legs (f), she now states her strict
preference for steak (s ą c ą f).
While Katya’s preference reversal in the face of a (seemingly) irrelevant alternative cannot be accom-
modated by the standard theory (as it violates the weak axiom of revealed preference (WARP)), it has a
simple, intuitive explanation. She prefers steak when the food is well prepared, but considers chicken more
resilient to the inept chef. In the typical restaurant, she believes it is unlikely the food will be well cooked,
and hence, has a preference for chicken. However, in the presence of an exotic dish, she deems it is more
likely the restaurant employs an expert chef and so, reverses her preference.
Example 2.A (Sen’s date). After dinner, Katya’s date, Mitya, asks whether she would like to end the date
and go home (h) or go next door and get a drink (d). Thinking the date a success, Katya strictly prefers
getting a drink (d ą h). However, before she can respond, Mitya offers a third option: the acquisition and
consumption of crystal methamphetamine (m). Katya now strictly prefers going home (h ą d ą m).
Here, again, Katya’s rather intuitive behavior cannot be explained by standard theory. She understands
the offer of methamphetamine as a signal regarding Mitya’s character. So, while she would prefer to continue
3the date as long as it is likely Mitya is reputable, his proposition is sufficient to sway her beliefs away from
such a outcome.
These vignettes exemplify two main components of the model. First, it is only the DM’s perception of
uncertainty that is changing; ex-post tastes are fixed. In other words, if the DM knew with certainty which
state of the world was to be realized, he would exhibit a constant preference across menus. Second, the
uncertainty is local. The realization regarding the quality of the food in one restaurant is not informative
about the quality in a different restaurant; that a previous date was virtuous is not evidence that a future
date will be.1
The first part of this paper axiomatizes a particular type of context-dependence which adheres to these
two restrictions. As in Anscombe and Aumann (1963), I examine a DM who ranks acts (i.e., functions)
from a state space, S, into lotteries over consumption, ∆pXq.2 Naturally, given the motivation, not all of
X will always be available. The DM’s entertains a family of preferences over acts, indexed by the subset of
X that is currently available. Therefore, for each A Ď X, we see the decision maker’s preference, ěA, over
tf : S Ñ ∆pAqu. Then, a menu-induced belief representation (MBR) is a single utility index, u : SˆX Ñ R,
and a menu-indexed family of beliefs tµAuAĎX Ď ∆pSq such that
UApfq “ EµA
´
Efpsqpups, xqq
¯
(MBR)
represents ěA, where Epipϕq denotes the expectation of the random variable ϕ with respect to the distribution
pi. Fixing the menu, the DM acts as a subjective expected utility maximizer. The utility index, u, is the same
across menus. This is the consequence of the main axiom, menu consistency . Menu consistency dictates,
conditional on the realization of a particular state, the DM’s preference for alternatives is fixed across menus.
Therefore, the context effect is entirely characterized by the change in the DM’s beliefs regarding the state
space. This places clear limits on the type of context effects that can be accommodated by a MBR. Since
any change in preference is the consequence of shifting beliefs, context dependence cannot reverse preference
over outcomes for which the resolution of the state is payoff irrelevant (note, because the tastes are state-
dependent, constant acts are not necessarily certain outcomes). The general model also imposes a continuity
condition3 –if two menus differ only slightly, then so do their associated beliefs.
Since this paper interperpates context effects as being entirely driven by informational concerns,4 it is of
interest to understand how the DM uses the context to update his belief. A modeler, who has access to a
DM’s preferences in a variety of contexts may want to understand what kind of subjective information the
DM believes is encoded by each context. Identifying the connection between a context and its induced belief
allows a modeler to make counterfactual arguments. For example, understanding that the DM believes frog
legs are the mark of a good restaurant (rather than, say, having 3 items on the menu) allows the modeler
to predict what the DM would do at a new restaurant. The second part of this paper explores how menus
might correspond to the beliefs they induce. In particular, what restrictions indicate that the DM, acting as
a Bayesian, holds a prior belief regarding the state space, and interprets each menu as a collection of signals
1Of course, one could tell a different story where there is a dynamic component by which the DM learns about the likelihood
of states from experience. This is well outside of the current model.
2For a set Y , ∆pY q is the set of distributions thereover.
3This is a vacuous assumption when X is a discrete space.
4In contrast to, for example, Kalai et al. (2002) in which the change in the rationalizing preference may be the result of
changing tastes.
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regarding the relative likelihood of each state? What further restrictions allow us to identify the prior and
the structure of these signals?
Following the anything goes result of Shmaya and Yariv (2016), any MBR can be rationalized by some
prior and set of signals. Without imposing any additional structure, Bayesianism imparts no falsifiable
restrictions. Thus, a modeler cannot disentangle an irrational DM who chooses a belief at random in each
context from a DM who acts rationally according to his prior belief and information encoded by the context.
Moreover, and equally damningly, the rationalizing Bayesian model is highly non-unique. In light of this, I
consider two more restrictive signal structures and their corresponding behavioral restrictions.
In the first signal structure, an elemental signal structure, the DM takes the elements of the menus as
signals. Specifically, he assumes that in each state, s, element x is included with probability lpx, sq and
excluded with 1´ lpx, sq. Therefore, the collection of included elements (the menu) is the result of a series
of conditionally independent random draws. If lpx, sq ą lpx, s1q then x is more likely to be available in state
s than s1, so observing x will increase the relative likelihood of state s.
Example 2.B (Sen’s date, revisited). Let S “ tr, du indicate reputable and depraved characters, respectively.
Katya’s has MBR preferences and the following utility index:
upr, hq “ 1 upr, dq “ 5 upr,mq “ ´10
upd, hq “ 1 upd, dq “ ´5 upd,mq “ ´10
She initially believes µprq “ 910 and µpdq “ 110 . She also believes that, while all dates will offer going home
and getting a drink, depraved characters offer meth with probability 110 , with reputable characters with only
probability 1100 .
After updating upon seeing the menu th, du, she holds the beliefs µprq “ 891981 and µpdq “ 90981 ; her preference
is given by Uth,dupdq “ 5p801q981 ą 1 “ Uth,duphq. After the menu th, d,mu, she holds the beliefs µprq “ 919 and
µpdq “ 1019 ; her preference is given by Uth,d,muphq “ 1 ą ´519 “ Uth,d,mupdq.
I show that this behavior is captured axiomatically by the restriction that the same element, included in
two different menus, must have the same proportional effect of beliefs. Moreover, given that a DM entertains
an elemental signal structure, the effect of each element on relative likelihoods can be identified uniquely.
Next, I consider a partitional signal structure (a special case of an elemental signal structure). Here, the
DM entertains a partition of the state space and each menu indicates a particular event of the partition has
obtained. In other words, the DM believes each menu can only occur in a particular subset of the state
space.
Example 1.B (Luce and Raiffa’s diner, revisited). Let S “ th,m, lu indicate high and medium and low
quality food, respectively. Katya’s has MBR preferences and the following utility index:
uph, cq “ 12 uph, sq “ 16 uph, fq “ 6
upm, cq “ 9 upm, sq “ 8 upm, fq “ 5
upl, cq “ 7 upl, sq “ 4 upl, fq “ 3
She initially believes each of the three types are equally likely: µphq “ µpmq “ µplq “ 13 . She also believes
only (and all) high quality restaurants offer a three dishes, while medium and low quality restaurants offer
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only chicken and steak. Katya entertains the partition tthu, tm, luu, where the frog legs’ inclusion stipulates
the first event obtains and their exclusion stipulates the second.
So, after seeing tc, su she believes food is either medium or low (with equal probability), so Utc,supcq “
8 ą 6 “ Utc,supsq, while the menu tc, s, fu indicates with certainty the food is good, so Utc,s,fupsq “ 16 ą
12 “ Utc,s,fupcq.
Given the nestedness of these statistical models, Example 1B can also be understood as being rationalized
by a elemental signal structure, where the lph, fq “ 1 and the lpm, fq “ lpl, fq “ 0. On the other hand,
Example 1 cannot be rationalized with a partitional structure because in/exclusion of methamphetamine
does not change the set of states Katya considers possible but does change her preferences.5
A different potential resolution for the context effect described in Example 1A would be the following:
a steak in a restaurant that offers frog legs, s1, is simply not the same object as a steak in a restaurant
without frog legs, s2: the DM has the completely standard and rationalizable preference s1 ą c ą s2. Any
apparent preference reversal is the result of the modelers conflation of the two distinct alternatives s1 and s2.
While this approach has the appeal of being trenchant and simple, it has two serious limitations. First, the
consolidation of s1 and s2 happens for good reason; both alternatives are described by the same objective
labels. So, from the modelers perspective, the only reason s1 and s2 should be differentiated is because of
the DM’s preference reversal. Of course, it could be equally likely that ‘chicken’ is the variable entity, rather
than steak. An unrestricted expansion of the choice set can rationalize any preference, but there is no unique
way of doing so.6 Because of this, such an approach cannot provide any explanation as to the mechanism
by which the DM changes his preference (for example, that frog legs are always an indication of high quality
food, regardless of the menu) and has no falsifiable predictions.
Second, expanding the choice set, without any restriction on how the expansion relates to larger patterns
in choice, eschews the informational channel—the DM himself only observes the label s. That is to say, while
the DM does regard a high-quality steak as different from a low quality steak, he cannot choose between
these options. Rather, he must choose s, which may turn out to be of either variety. The inclusion of frog
legs does not change the final (ex-post) outcomes, but rather the probabilities they occur. This paper, by
looking at acts, captures exactly this phenomenon. By understanding the change in preference to be related
to the change in subjective beliefs, this paper is able to identify the type of information the DM learns from
the in/exclusion of alternatives.
1.1 Organization
This paper is organized as follows. The general model is presented in Section 2, with the representation
theorem for the main result contained in Section 2.3. Section 2.4 discusses the shortcomings of a variant
model with state-independent utilities. Section 3 explores the additional restrictions necessary to capture
particular signal structures. Finally, a survey of relevant literature is found in Section 4. Appendix A
provides an example of how menu dependent beliefs could arise naturally in a strategic environment. All
proofs are contained in the appendices B and C.
5Of course, this observation assumes we have identified the posterior distributions. Had we only had the sparse preferences
outlined in Example 1, we would not have enough data to identify the signal structure.
6One could ask what is the minimal expansion necessary for rationalization—this is essentially the motivation behind Kalai
et al. (2002)
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2 General Model
2.1 Structure and Primitives
Let X be a separable and metrizable topological space, representing the grand set of consumption alterna-
tives, and with typical elements x, y, z. Define x‹ and x‹ to be two distinguished elements of X, referred to
as universal alternatives, and set ‹ “ tx‹, x‹u. Let clpXq denote the set of closed subsets of X; endow clpXq
with the Hausdorff metric topology. LetMpXq denote the set of all subsets of X which contain ‹.7 Typical
elements are A,B,C. Elements of MpXq are called menus, with the interpretation that they represent the
set of currently available consumption alternatives.
For any topological space Y , let ∆pY q denote the set of all probability measures on pY,BpY qq, where
BpY q denotes the Borel σ-algebra on Y . If µ P ∆pY q, and ϕ : Y Ñ R is bounded and continuous, let
Eµpϕq “
$’’&’’%
ż
Y
ϕpyq dµpyq whenever Y is infinite, and,ÿ
Y
ϕpyqµpyq whenever Y is finite,
denote the expectation of ϕ with respect to µ. Endow ∆pY q with the weak* topology, i.e., so that the Eµ ϕ
is continuous in µ.
Notice, for each A P MpXq, A is the subset of a separable metric space, and thus, separable itself, so
∆pAq is metrizable. In the standard abuse of notation, identify x P X with the degenerate distribution on
x. Typical elements of ∆pXq are denoted pi, ρ, τ .
Let S denote a finite state space. Endow ∆pXqS with the product topology. The objects of choice will be
menu-induced acts: for each A PMpXq define FA “ ∆pAqS “ tf : S Ñ ∆pXq|fpsq P ∆pAq,@s P Su. An act
is a commitment to a particular consumption conditional on the realization of the state space, and so, FA
corresponds to the acts available given the menu A. In other words, when the set of available alternatives is
A, then the only feasible acts are those that provide only lotteries over A.
For each act, fpsq is the distribution over X obtained for realization s. Again, abusing notation, identify
each pi P ∆pXq with the degenerate act such that pipsq “ pi for all s. For any f, g P FX , and event E Ď S, let
f´Eg be the act that coincides with f everywhere except on E, where it coincides with g. Further, for some
α P p0, 1q let αf`p1´αqg be the point-wise mixture of f and g (i.e., pαf`p1´αqgqpsq “ αfpsq`p1´αqgpsq
for each s P S). It is immediate that if f P FA and g P FB then f´Eg and αf ` p1 ´ αqg both belong to
FAYB (in particular, note the case when A “ B).
The primitive of the model is the family of preference relations těA Ă FA ˆ FAuAPMpXq. That is, the
DM’s preference over the acts which are available given each possible menu. With regards to notation, it is
assumed whenever ‘f ěA g’ is written both f and g belong to FA. For any relation ě, let ą and „ denote
the asymmetric and symmetric components, respectively.
2.2 Axioms
The goal of the most general representation is to provide the basic framework in which a DM might condition
his beliefs regarding the state space on the menu at hand. That is, the DM treats the set of currently available
7I will interpret ‹ as a set of outside options, which explains their universal availability.
2.2 Axioms 7
consumption alternatives as a signal regarding the likelihood of different states. Given the menu, the DM
acts as a subjective expected utility maximizer, with respect to his menu-induced beliefs. Clearly, each menu
dependent preference should satisfy the expected utility axioms:
[A1: Expected Utility (EU)] For each A PMpXq, ěA satisfies the expected utility axioms, namely,
1. Weak Order. ěA is a non-trivial weak order.
2. Independence. For all f, g, h P FA and α P p0, 1q, f ěA g ðñ αf ` p1´ αqhěA αg ` p1´
αqh.
3. Continuity. For all f P FA, the sets tg P FA|gěA fu and tg P FA|f ěA gu are closed in FA.
The following well known result (so well known in fact, that it is included only to fix notation for expo-
sitional purposes8) shows EU provides the expected utility structure for each menu dependent preference.
Proposition 2.1 (Expected Utility). těA Ă FAˆFAuAPMpXq satisfies EU if and only if for each A PMpAq
there exists some continuous and bounded w : S ˆX Ñ R such that
UV NMA pfq “
ÿ
s
´
EfpsqpwAps, xqq
¯
,
represents ěA. Moreover, if wAps, xq and wˆAps, xq both represent ěA, then wAps, xq “ aAwˆAps, xq ` bApsq
where aA P R`` and bApsq P R for all s P S.
Recall that fpsq and gpsq are given, objective probability measures. The index wp¨q can be decomposed
into tastes (the utility of consuming an object given the state) and beliefs (the subjective likelihood of each
state). Indeed, choose some probability distribution µ P ∆pSq such that µpsq ą 0 and let uAps, xq “ wAps,xqµpsq ;
it is clear that
Eµ
´
EfpsqpuAps, xqq
¯
represents ěA. Of course, this creates the classic problem of multiple rationalizing beliefs: if we consider
some other ν P ∆pSq such that νpsq ą 0, then ν and u1Aps, xq “ wAps,xqνpsq also represent the same preference.
We cannot identify the DM’s tastes for ex-post outcomes or his beliefs; the two are jointly determined.
The motivation for expanding our data to include the family of menu-induced preferences is to understand
how the menu can alter the beliefs of the DM. In light of this, it becomes obvious further structure is needed
to separate the effect on the perception of uncertainty (i.e., menu induced changes in belief) from other
internal changes in preference (i.e., a change in tastes).
The first novel axiom, menu-consistency, is the first step towards such a disentanglement, and, captures
the main behavior behind menu-induced beliefs. It states that the DM’s tastes for outcomes do not depend
on the menu at hand. This implies, any difference in preferences across menus must be the result of a change
in perception of the underlying uncertainty.
Of course, the DM only cares about the assignment to state s if he believes there is a possibility s will
be realized. Therefore, menu-consistency should only hold after realizations assigned positive probability
according to the DM’s subjective assessment. To make such ideas precise, I first need to consider null events.
8Of course, for a reference with the exact set up see Grandmont (1972), Theorem 2 and its Corollary.
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Definition 1. An event, E Ă S, is null for menu A (hereafter, null-A) if for all f, g P FA,
f´Eg „A f.
Let NA denote the set of states that are null-A, and N denote the set of everywhere null states: N “Ş
APMpAqNA.9
Null events, in general, have two indistinguishable interpretations. First, that the DM is indifferent
between all available options conditional on the realization of the null event, E; second, that the DM places
zero probability on E occurring. However, assuming the DM’s tastes are consistent across different menus
(the assumption that will be formalized shortly), it is possible to differentiate these two interpretations of
null events. If a state, s, is null-A, but there exists a different menu, B, for which the DM displays a strict
preference over elements of A (given realization of s), it must be that s was assigned zero probability when
facing A. This is because the DM cannot be indifferent to all elements of A (contingent on s) since he
displays strict preference in the menu B. This is formalized by evidently-null events, first considered in
Karni et al. (1983).
Definition 2. An event, E Ă S, is evidently null for menu A (hereafter, e-null-A) if E is null-A and
for all s P E there exists some menu B such that
pf´sgq ąB f
for some f, g in FAXB. Let EA denote the union of all e-null-A events.10
With this definition in mind we can now define menu consistency.
[A2: Menu Consistency (MC)] For all A,B P MpXq and s P S with s R EA Y EB, and all f P FA,
g P FB, h P FAXB, and such that fpsq “ gpsq,
f´shěA f ðñ g´shěB g.
If těAuAPMpXq is menu-consistent, the DM’s tastes for outcomes are identical across menus. To see this,
let pi “ fpsq “ gpsq and ρ “ hpsq. Then MC states that the DM’s preference between ρ and pi, in state
s, does not depend on the context in which the decision is made (i.e., does not depend on the menu from
which the acts were constructed). Behaviorally, this indicates that any context effect does not alter the DM’s
preferences conditional on the realization of a particular state. In other words, if the DM knew the true
state, there would be no context effect. It is this restriction that differentiates this model from a more general
interpretation of context effects as psychological biases without foundation in rational behavior. The change
in behavior across menus is not the result of a change in the state-dependent preference for outcomes (objects
about which the DM is ostensibly certain) but of a change in his perception of the between-state-tradeoffs
(the domain of uncertainty).
By the very nature of the problem at hand, we are losing structure in comparison to the standard model
and so the axioms are weaker in comparison. As such, MC does not characterize a new behavior that is the
9Notice, the set of null-A events form a lattice with respect to set inclusion, with NA the maximal element.
10Notice, the set of e-null-A events form a sub-lattice of the lattice of null-A events, with EA the corresponding maximal
element.
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result of context dependent beliefs, but rather places limits on how much structure is lost. What structure
is retained by MC guarantees we can find a family of representation for těAuAPMpXq that shares a common
utility index. In other words, the primitive is represented by a single utility index and a family of menu-
induced beliefs. It is important to note that this does not rule out preference reversals, even over constant
acts. Each menu carries with it a perception of uncertainty, and can therefore change the DM’s preferences
for acts. However, given menu-consistency, any preference reversal is due entirely to the change in beliefs,
and not because of changes in ex-post tastes. Setting f “ g in the definition, consistency guarantees that
the ordering between f´sρ and f´spi hold regardless of the ambient menu.
Under the definition of a frame as (seemingly irrelevant) information which alters the DM’s perception
of uncertainty, then EU and MC exactly capture the behavior where the DM uses the menu as a frame.
Unfortunately, from a practical vantage, this is insufficient, as the problem of non-uniqueness of beliefs
persists. When tastes and beliefs cannot be separated, we cannot identify the avenue by which context
effects alter the DM’s choice process.
To overcome the issue of multiple rationalizing beliefs, Anscombe and Aumann (1963) restricted pref-
erences to be state independent (i.e., in every non-null state, the ranking over distributions is the same).
State dependency is a very restrictive assumption; it interprets states as abstract probabilistic events that
have no meaning outside of their use as betting devices. Beyond this philosophical issue, state-dependence
is a necessary requirement to capture the full gamut of context effects (this necessity is made precise in
Remark 3.1). For these reasons, this model weakens state-independence to apply only over ‹. UV plays the
same roles as state independence (equivalently, monotonicity). By ensuring, over the relatively small domain
‹, that preferences in each state coincide, beliefs can be uniquely recovered from choice data. Under the
interpretation of universal elements as outside options, it is natural that the ranking of these elements does
not change across different menus.
[A3: Universality (UV)] For all A PMpXq and s P S with s R NA
f´sx‹ ąA f´sx‹.
for all f P FA.
It is also of interest (when X is indiscrete) to understand when the context effect acts in a continuous
manner.
[A4: Continuity of Context (CC)] If tAnunPN converges to A in MpXq, then for all f, g P F‹, if
f ěAn g for all n then f ěA g.
In other words, the DM’s preference over universal acts is continuous with respect to changes in the
menu.11 If CC were violated, then there would exist a menu A such that for any arbitrarily small distance,
, there exists a menu, A, that (strictly) reverses some strict preference over universal acts f and g. Thus,
there would be a discrete jump in the DM’s preference. Of course, CC applies only to universal acts so such
a jump in preferences corresponds to discrete jump in the DM’s beliefs about the likelihood of states. Hence,
CC requires that the information encoded by a context changes continuously with the context.
11Recall, convergence, of the sequence tAnunPN, is with respect to the Hausdorff metric on MpXq.
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2.3 Menu Induced Belief Representation
Theorem 2.2 (Menu Induced Belief Representation). (a) těAuAPMpXq satisfies EU, MC, UV, and CC if
and only if there exists a state-dependent utility index, u : SˆX Ñ R, such that up¨, x‹q ” 1 and up¨, x‹q ” 0,
and such that the projections u|A are bounded and continuous for all A PMpXq, and a continuous function,12
tµA P ∆pSquAPMpXq, such that for all A PMpXq,
UApfq “ EµA
´
Efpsqpups, xqq
¯
(MBR)
represents ěA, and µApsq “ 0 if and only if s P EA YN .
(b) Moreover, the family of beliefs tµA P ∆pSquAPMpXq is unique and the utility index, up¨q, is unique up to
null states.
Proof. In appendix C. 
The proof is quite straightforward. First, EU provides a linear representation for each ěA. By UV
these representations can be decomposed uniquely into tastes (over A) and beliefs, where the utility index
is normalized as in the statement of the theorem. Then, these utility indexes can be stitched together to
provide a single u over the whole of X. Finally, MC ensures that this common index will jointly represent
each ěA and CC that beliefs will change continuously.
Because the utility index is fixed across decision problems, the shifting of probabilities is the only avenue
for preferences to change. Thus, if an act f is preferred to g on a state-by-state basis, then it is preferred to g
in every menu (this is, of course, precisely the content of MC). It is through the menu dependent beliefs that
this structure allows for framing effects, were by the DM’s preferences change in the face of new alternatives.
It follows that the types of preference reversals that are allowable is limited.
2.4 State-Independence
In light of axiom UV, it may seem parsimonious to quit worrying about the distinguished elements, x‹ and
x‹, and require state independence outright. This can, in fact, be accomplished by strengthening MC.
[A2˚: Strong Menu Consistency (SMC)] For all A,B PMpXq and s P S with s R EA and s1 R EB,
and all f P FA, g P FB, h P FAXB, and such that fpsq “ gps1q,
f´shěA f ðñ g´s1hěB g.
SMC states that tastes are consistent, not only across menus (if A ‰ B) but also across states (if s ‰ s1).
As such, it implies the canonical form of state independence for each ěA. When MC is replaced by SMC in
Theorem 2.2, the resulting representation coincides except the utility index, u : X Ñ R is state-independent :
USIA pfq “ EµA
´
Efpsqpupxqq
¯
, (SI-MBR)
represents ěA.13 The existence of the family of beliefs, their uniqueness, and the uniqueness of the utility
12i.e., whenever An converges to A, µAn converges to µA.
13Notice, UV is somewhat redundant in the presence of SMC. In fact, if we are willing to entertain a bit of notational juggling,
we can forego it entirely.
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index are all the same as in Theorem 2.2. While this approach is only a small deviation from the general
representation, it implies that there is no uncertainty regarding the preference of constant acts. As discussed
before, in order for context effects to have observable content, it must be that the underlying uncertainty is
payoff relevant. Together, these facts imply that SMC prohibits the DM from changing his preference over
constant acts between different menus.
Remark 2.3. Let těAuAPMpXq be represented by (SI-MBR). Then for all A,B P MpXq, and pi, ρ P
∆pAXBq, piěA ρ ðñ piěB ρ.
Remark 2.3 can be seen by noting that USIA ppiq “ Epipupxqq, which does not depend on A.
3 Bayesian Frames
The general representation, (MBR), assumes that context effects arise only though an informational channel—
that the DM changes his beliefs about the relevant uncertainty after seeing the available alternatives. It
does not, however, offer any insight into the connection between the menu at hand and the effect it exerts on
beliefs. This section provides an exploration into the behavioral implications, and identification, of particular
context effects.
It is of interest to identify the restrictions on behavior that ensure the DM is acting rationally with
respect to some information structure that gives rise to the family of menu-induced beliefs. Consider the
interpretation that the DM entertains a prior belief over the state space, µ P ∆pSq, and observes, along
with the menu, some signals, drawn from a (finite) signal space, Θ. The DM also entertains a likelihood
function that specifies the likelihood of a given signal, contingent on the true state, l : Θˆ S Ñ R`. Under
this interpretation, we say the information structure pµ, l,Θq generates tµA|A PMpXqu, if the DM’s menu-
induced beliefs are the posteriors generated by observing the signals. To keep things notationally clean,
through this subsection, I assume that X is finite and N “ H. I always assume the prior, µ, has full
support. These assumptions ensure the updating procedures are binding everywhere, as it alleviates the
concern regarding 0 probability events.
Of course, for the posteriors to be indexed by menus there must be a connection between the signals and
the menu. At the most general level, the two coincide: Θ “MpXq.
Definition 3. An information structure based on menus, pµ, l,MpXqq, generates tµA|A PMpXqu, if
µApsq “ µpsqlpA, sqEµplpA, s1qq (3.1)
and
ř
MpXq lpA, sq “ 1,
ř
s lpA, sq ą 0 for all A PMpXq and s P S.14
The requirement that the DM entertains some generating pµ, l,MpXqq, provides no testable implications.
In other words, every MBR can be described by some prior and likelihood function over menu realizations.
The ability to choose both the signals and the prior provides enough degrees of freedom so that it is always
possible to rationalize the family of menu induced beliefs.
14The first requirement is equivalent to
ř
MpXq lpA, sq ą 0, and is included in the current form only for its interpretational
content. Under this normalization, we can think of lpA, sq as the probability of seeing menu A in state s. The second requirement
states that all menus are ex-ante possible. This ensures that 3.1 is always well defined.
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Proposition 3.1. Let těAuAPMpXq be represented by some (MBR), with beliefs tµA|A P MpXqu. Then
there exists some pµ, l,MpXqq that generates tµA|A PMpXqu as in (3.1).
Proof. In appendix C. 
This result is a corollary of Lemma 1 in Shmaya and Yariv (2016). To understand the economic pertinence
of the above result, consider the following two hypotheses regarding a MBR decision maker: (i) that the DM
believes that likelihood of different alternatives being available depends on the underlying state of the world,
and so rationally revises his beliefs after observing the available menu, and (ii) the DM associates at random a
belief regarding the state space to each menu. In the first scenario, the DM could be considered a Bayesian,
and there are many scenarios where identifying the DM’s subjective information would be economically
relevant. In the second, the DM could be considered irrational, deciding randomly which beliefs to hold.
The above result indicated that a modeler who wishes to test if WARP violations present in a data set arise
from hypothesis (i) or (ii) cannot do so without making more stringent assumption on the structure of the
information.
Setting Θ “MpXq assumes no relation between the signals associated with different menus, and it is this
generality that renders behavior wholly unconstrained. However, under more specific assumptions regarding
the structure of the signals, there are falsifiable restrictions on observable preference. Thus, while we can
never rule out the possibility that the DM is acting in a Bayesian manner with respect to some signal space,
we can rule out particular models of information.
Recall in example 1B, Katya believes, it is much less likely that a reputable date, rather than depraved
one, offers methamphetamine, m. Moreover, she believes this is independent of whatever else was available.
So, for any menu A, Katya will believe her date is more likely to be depraved when A Y m is offered
rather than A alone. More generally, we could think that each element is offered with some probability that
depends on the state. Under this interpretation, if the true state is s, then x will be available with probability
lpx, sq P r0, 1s. Whenever x is more likely to be available in state s than in state s1 the observation that x
is available increases the relative likelihood of s compared to s1; whenever it is excluded, beliefs shift in the
other direction. This corresponds to the signal structure where Θ “ X, and where signals are conditionally
independent.
Definition 4. An information structure based on elements, pµ, l,Xq, with conditionally independent
signals generates tµA|A PMpXqu if
µApsq “
µpsqśxPA lpx, sqśyRAp1´ lpy, sqq
Eµ
`ś
xPA lpx, s1q
ś
yRAp1´ lpy, s1qq
˘ , (3.2)
and lpx, sq P r0, 1s for all px, sq P X ˆ S, and lpx‹, sq “ lpx‹, sq “ 1 for all s P S.15
The fact that signals are independent, indicates that the inclusion or exclusion of a particular element
carries the same informational content regardless of the composition of the menu. Of course, even though the
informational value is the same, the magnitude of the effect of this information is relative to the information
provided by the other elements included (or excluded) from the menu. This behavior is captured by the
following axiom.
15The requirement regarding x‹ and x‹, stems from the fact that they are necessarily realized in every state, and hence,
uninformative.
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[A5: Independent Signals (IS)] For all x P X, and A,B P MpXq, such that x R A Y B, and states
s, s1 R NA YNB, if for some distributions piA, ρA, P ∆pAq and piB , ρB , P ∆pBq: px‹q´spiA „A px‹q´s1ρA and
px‹q´spiB „B px‹q´s1ρB, then for all α P p0, 1q,
px‹q´spiAěAYxpx‹q´s1pαρA ` p1´ αqx‹q ðñ px‹q´spiB ěBYxpx‹q´s1pαρB ` p1´ αqx‹q. (3.3)
IS states that the proportional change in belief, in response to the inclusion of an element x, is the same
across all menus. Without x, obtaining piA in state s and ρA in state s1 (and x‹ everywhere else) are equally
appealing, given menu A. When x is included, the beliefs change, and therefore, so do preferences. IS states
that the same proportional change in preferences must occur, regardless of the initial menu. So if the change
in preferences is such that, piA in state s is now indifferent to αρA`p1´αqx‹ in state s1 (and x‹ everywhere
else) given A, then the same α proportional shift preserves indifference when moving from B to BY x. This
behavior, along with the general representation, exactly captures the updating procedure given by (3.2).
Theorem 3.2. Let těAuAPMpXq be represented by some (MBR), with beliefs tµA|A PMpXqu, all of which
have full support. Then, there exists some pµ, l,Xq that generates tµA|A PMpXqu as in (3.2) if and only if
těAuAPMpXq satisfies IS.
Proof. In appendix C. 
The requirement that all beliefs have full support is tantamount to assuming lpx, sq P p0, 1q for all x R ‹
and s P S, and ensures that (3.2) is well defined for all menus and states. To include null states in such a set
up adds little intuition and greatly increases the level of attention to technical detail that needs to be paid.
In example 2B, Katya believes all high quality (and only high quality) restaurants serve frog legs, f ; the
inclusion of f in the menu indicates with certainty that the restaurant is high quality: the event thu Ă S.
Alternatively, she believes that medium and low quality restaurants always offer chicken and steak tc, su.
Observing a menu excluding f is indicative of the event tm, lu Ă S. She entertains the partition of S,
tthu, tm, luu with the composition of the menu signifying which event has obtained. This is captured by a
special case of an elemental signal structure, where lpx, ¨q is constant within each event of the partition.
Definition 5. Let 9„ be an equivalence relation on S ˆ S. An information structure based on 9„ is a
information structure based on elements in which, for any s, s1 P S, (i) s 9„s1 implies lpx, sq “ lpx, s1q for all
x P X and (ii)  ps 9„s1q and śxPA lpx, sqśyRAp1´lpy, sqq ą 0 jointly imply śxPA lpx, s1qśyRAp1´lpy, s1qq “
0.
The first additional requirement dictates that within each event of the partition induced by 9„, each menu
is equally likely in each state (e.g., the menu tc, su is equally likely when the state is m as when it is l). The
second requirement ensures each menu appears only within a single event of the partition (e.g., the menu
tc, su is possible only in the event tm, lu and not in the event thu). Hence, each menu indicates a particular
event of the the partition of the state space given by 9„. If two menus, A and B are both possible in event
E, then they carry exactly the same informational content (that E has obtained), and so induce the same
preferences over common acts.
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[A6: Partitional Signals (PS)] For all A P MpXq, let N pAq “ tB P MpXq|pNBqc X pNAqc ‰ Hu.
Then (i) for all f, g P F‹, B P N pAq implies,
f ěA g ðñ f ěB g.
and (ii) there exits an x such that x P B ðñ B P N or x R B ðñ B P N .
PS dictates that any two menus sharing a non-null state must induce the same preference over acts.
Because the general representation fixes tastes across different menus, PS implies that if the two menus
induce beliefs with a overlapping supports, those beliefs must coincide completely. It is clear that this
captures the behavior generated by a partitional signal structure. Notice that PS implies IS.
Theorem 3.3. Let těAuAPMpXq be represented by some (MBR), with beliefs tµA|A PMpXqu. Then, there
exists a unique 9„ P S ˆ S and an information structure pµ, l,Xq based on 9„ that generates tµA|A PMpXqu
if and only if těAuAPMpXq satisfies PS.
Proof. In appendix C. 
4 Literature Review
Tversky and Kahneman (1981) developed the notion of framing –the idea that decisions are influenced
by their surrounding context. Framing has a large literature, both in the theoretical, experimental, and
psychological settings (Kahneman and Tversky, 1984; Rubinstein and Salant, 2008; Tversky and Shafir,
1992). A particular type of framing concerns the consideration of menu, or currently available alternatives,
referred to in the literature as context dependence. In contrast to this model, context dependence is often
associated with particular psychological heuristics such as a basing choice on the difference between the
attributes of outcomes or reluctance to choose extreme outcomes (Simonson and Tversky, 1992).
That a menu may contain information relevant to the DM’s choice over the objects it contains was
first articulated by Luce and Raiffa (1957) and expounded upon by Sen (1993, 1997). Sen describes the
notion of the epistemic value of a menu with more tact than I could hope to achieve: “What is offered for
choice can give us information about the underlying situation, and can thus influence our preference over
the alternatives, as we see them. For example, the chooser may learn something about the person offering
the choice on the basis of what he or she is offering.” It is by paraphrasing/formalizing the vignettes in Luce
and Raiffa (1957) and Sen (1997) that I constructed the examples that run throughout this paper.
There are several other models that account for preference reversals and WARP violations by appealing
to a DM who optimizes his choice relative to multiple (different) preferences. Kalai et al. (2002) consider a
model in which the DM’s preference ordering depends on the menu. Given a slight bit of conceptual juggling,
this paper can be though of as a generalization of that model by allowing the DM to hold probabilistic beliefs
about his preference. In other words, if for each menu, the DM placed probably 1 on some state, then his
preferences over constant acts would be described by the Kalai et al. (2002) model. In Kalai et al. (2002), the
authors seek to identify the minimal set of preferences required to rationalize data, which generically will not
be the unique set of rationalizing preferences. The use of acts in this paper (rather than constant outcomes)
is to facilitate the identification of this probabilistic belief—the representation, and specifically the set of
state-dependent preferences, is unique. Moreover, the restriction that set of rationalizing preferences share
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a common utility index, allows for the identification of the information the DM believes is encoded in each
menu (under the further restrictions outlined in Section 3).
Manzini and Mariotti (2007) also consider a model wherein the DM considers multiple preferences (ra-
tionales). There, the DM applies the same set of rationales to each choice set, in a sequential manner.
WARP violations are the result of non-unique selections by earlier rationales. Interestingly, when all the
rationales are binary equivalence relations (partition X into good and bad subsets) then such choice behavior
is rationalizable Mandler et al. (2012). Apesteguia and Ballester (2010) contemplate on the complexity of
identification in these models.
There have been several decision theory papers which deal with characterizing framing effects that stem
from informational sources. Ahn and Ergin (2010) considers a DM whose beliefs, and hence preferences,
depend on the description of the state space. There a depiction of the state space is a partition of it, and
preferences are defined over all acts measurable with respect to the partition. The interpretation is that
different descriptions of the state space might alert the DM of contingencies which he would otherwise be
unaware. Bourgeois-Gironde and Giraud (2009) construct a model of “rational” framing in the domain
of Bolker–Jeffrey decision theory. They take as motivation, and provide an axiomatic foundation for, the
observation of Sher and McKenzie (2006) that (seemingly) logically equivalent statements might in fact
contain different information because the choice to use one description over another might itself impart
information. As such, Bourgeois-Gironde and Giraud (2009) consider a set of frames and allow two different,
but logically equivalent, statements that belong to different frames to induce different beliefs of the DM.
The epistemic aspect of decision problems has been studied by Kochov (2010) in a model that shares
many philosophical motivations with this one. Kochov’s model defines a decision problem as a collection
of menus, and imposes the canonical axioms (i.e., Dekel et al. (2001)) on a preference relation over each
decision problem to back out a problem-specific subjective state space. The primary mechanism by which
epistemic content alters the decision makers preference in Kochov’s model is by changing the composition
of the subjective state space (i.e., the difference in preference is mitigated through a change in tastes, rather
than beliefs). The interpretation of menus revealing different unforeseen contingencies is problematic from
the modelers point of view: it is impossible to observe a decision maker who is both aware and unaware of a
particular contingency. This paper, on the other hand, explains the same behavior by confining the context
effect to be a local one.
The appeal to a DM who holds multiple beliefs in contexts has been explored in different setting, including
the elicitation of state dependent preferences, psychological states, and modeling growing awareness. Karni et
al. (1983) propose a DM who ranks alternatives after some hypothetical event with a known probability. Like
this paper, there is an imposed consistency in ex-post tastes across different decision problems. Technically
similar issues arise in Karni and Vierø (2013, 2017), which model a decision maker who discovers novel
information, and so expands the state space he entertains. Naturally, the authors contemplate the connection
between preferences before and after the expanded state space, and like this paper and Karni et al. (1983),
require that the DM’s tastes for ex-post outcomes are fixed.16 However, the authors further impose, in
what they term “reverse bayesianism”, that the proportional likelihood of states remains fixed, so that the
(chronologically) first belief coincides with the posterior belief after conditioning the (chronologically) second
16It should be noted that the authors assume a monotonicity condition, so that preferences are assumed to be state-
independent.
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belief on the event that the true state is in the (chronologically) first state space. This is reminiscent of the
updating procedure that underlies partitional information structures, albeit without the additional issues
arising from the incorporation of novel states.17 Also related, Karni and Safra (2016) take a somewhat
converse approach. There, the decision maker has beliefs regarding his state dependent preferences, or states
of mind which induce a preference over menus, rather than the menu inducing the belief about the state
space. As such, it is the DM’s beliefs regarding a subjective state space (his state of mind) that is invariant
across decision problems.
It is also worth noting that models of endogenous reference dependence can be interpreted as context
dependence. In these models the decision problem is associated with a reference level of utility by which the
DM evaluates each outcome (Koszegi and Rabin, 2006; Ok et al., 2015). As such, adding outcomes that will
effect the reference point will thereby change the DM’s preferences. These models can be thought of as a
specific case of epistemic concerns; the reference point is information about some underlying state variable.
A decision problem associated with reference point, r, is an indicator that the state-of-the-world is sr.
Finally, this paper is related to the decision theoretic literature on identifying the conditions under which
a decision maker is Bayesian updating with respect to subjective (and hence unseen) signals, for example,
Lehrer and Teper (2015). In particular, the general model can be seen as a special case of the subjective
signal structure discussed in Shmaya and Yariv (2016).
A From Equilibrium to MBR
If DM’s entertain beliefs dependent on the available options, but these beliefs do not respond to the true
probability of events given the menu, then the economic agents who construct menus (i.e., restaurant owners
and potential dates) will be able to manipulate the DM’s beliefs for personal gain. For example, low quality
restaurants start to offer frog legs, to entice the DM to order a steak. In any repeated or large scale interaction,
this would lead a rational DM to change his perception of the information contained in a given context, in
turn leading the supply side to change its behavior, etc. The present section shows that MBR preferences can
arise as the equilibrium of such a strategic exchange, where the different types of suppliers can differentiate
themselves by offering different menus, and the DM correctly understands the signaling mechanism. Further,
the signal structure is a partitional one. The partitional signal structure arises naturally as the consequence
of signaling equilibria because it is the inclusion of particular elements acts as a signal, so different types of
sellers select different compositions of goods to offer. In a partial pooling equilibrium, not all types of sellers
can be distinguished, so menu chosen in equilibrium is indicative of a set of types—precisely the behavior in
a partitional structure.
Consider the environment where, first, a seller constructs a menu of goods to offer the buyer at posted
prices, and then, the buyer decides whether or not to buy any of the offered goods. In other words, the
sellers act as stores, who can curate their selections. Sellers are privately endowed with a type (read: the
seller’s quality or ability), and this type governs both the cost of stocking a particular good, and also, the
utility a buyer derives from its consumption. In this environment, under standard single-crossing conditions,
different types of sellers might differentiate themselves in equilibrium by offering different menus of goods.
In such an equilibrium, the seller’s beliefs regarding the type of seller, and hence, the value of the offered
17Notice the resemblance between PS and MC and Karni and Vierø’s ‘invariant risk preferences’ and ‘awareness consistency’
axioms, respectively.
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goods, is dependent on the offered menu. Specifically, if the equilibrium is in pure strategies, this induces
a MBR with partitional signal structure. In the example below, high type restaurants want to distinguish
themselves as such, in order to sell steak at a high profit. In oder to do so, they offer frog legs, which are
expensive for worse restaurants to carry. Because the worse types do not find it profitable to carry frog legs,
in equilibrium, the diner who observes frog legs knows with certainty he is in a high quality restuarant.
Example 1.C (Luce and Raiffa’s diner, one last time). There are four types of restaurants, high (h), medium
(m), and low (l) and bad (b) quality. Each can offer any selection of chicken (c), steak (s), or frog legs (f).
The cost for a particular restaurant to keep an item on the menu (train the chef, provide a wine pairing,
keep fresh ingredients, etc), is given by the following matrix:
chpcq “ 1 chpsq “ 2 chpfq “ 3
cmpcq “ 1 cmpsq “ 2 cmpfq “ 9
clpcq “ 1 clpsq “ 3 clpfq “ 9
cbpcq “ 1 cbpsq “ 10 cbpfq “ 9
A patron, given that the quality of the food is known, has preferences (in dollar terms) according to
uph, cq “ 12 uph, sq “ 16 uph, fq “ 6
upm, cq “ 9 upm, sq “ 8 upm, fq “ 5
upl, cq “ 7 upl, sq “ 4 upl, fq “ 3
upb, cq “ 1 upb, sq “ 0 upb, fq “ 0
Each type of restaurant can select any subset of the main courses (along with posted prices) to offer potential
diners. Given the observed menu and the subsequently updated beliefs, a diner will select the course that
maximizes her utility (her expected utility from consumption less the posted price). All diners can take an
outside option with utility 0.
Assume, initially, the diner has a uniform prior over the different types of restaurants. Then the following
is a Bayes-Nash equilibrium. The high type offers tc, s, fu (at prices $8, $16, and $8, respectively), the
medium and low types both offers tc, su (at $8, and $6, respectively), and the bad type offers tcu (at price of
$1). This is a partial pooling equilibrium, the diner places probability 1 on h after seeing tc, s, fu and chooses
s, places probability 12 on both medium and low when he sees tc, su and chooses c, and, places probability 1
on b after seeing tcu and chooses c. When seeing any other menu, she places probability 1 on b, and takes
the outside option.
Notice that in this example, both the utilities for outcomes and the beliefs after the observation tc, s, fu
and tc, su map exactly to Katya’s tastes and beliefs given the same observations. As such, the behavior
of buyers in such an equilibrium would correspond exactly to the MBR with the partitional information
structure described in Example 1B.
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Lemma 1. If těAuAPMpXq satisfies UV, then for all A PMpXq, NA “ EA YN .
Proof. Fix some A PMpXq. By definition both EA and N are subsets of NA, so, EA YN Ď NA. Towards
the opposite inclusion, let s P NA. We will show that if s R EA then s P N . So assume further, that s R EA.
Since s is null-A, x‹ „A x‹. Since s is not e-null-A, for every B PMpXq, x‹ „B x‹. By the contrapositive
of UV we have s P NB . Since this holds for all B, s P N . 
Definition 6. For a menu A PMpXq, define the equalizer of A, eA : pNAqc ˆ pNAqc Ñ R`` as
eAps, s1q ÞÑ
$&% 1α such that px‹q´spαx‹ ` p1´ αqx‹q „A px‹q´s1x‹ if px‹q´sx‹ěApx‹q´s1x‹α such that px‹q´s1pαx‹ ` p1´ αqx‹q „A px‹q´sx‹ if px‹q´s1x‹ ąA px‹q´sx‹
That eA is well defined follows from the following observation.
Lemma 2. Let těAuAPMpXq be represented by some (MBR), with beliefs tµA|A P MpXqu, all of which
have full support. Then, for all A PMpXq, eAps, s1q “ µApsqµAps1q .
Proof. If px‹q´sx‹ěApx‹q´s1x‹, then for some α P p0, 1q, we have px‹q´s
`
αx‹ ` p1 ´ αqx‹
˘ „A px‹q´s1x‹.
Using (MBR), we have that UA
´
px‹q´s1x‹
¯
“ µAps1q, and UA
´
px‹q´s
`
αx‹`p1´αqx‹
˘¯ “ αµApsq. Setting
eAps, s1q “ 1α , delivers ther result. The other case is similar. 
Lemma 3. Let těAuAPMpXq be represented by some (MBR) with beliefs tµA|A PMpXqu, all of which have
full support. Then těAuAPMpXq satisfies IS if and only if, for all x P X and A,B PMpXq with x R AYB,
and states s, s1 P S, we have
eAps, s1q
eAYxps, s1q “
eBps, s1q
eBYxps, s1q . (B.1)
Proof. Necessity. Assume that (B.1) holds, with x P X, A,B PMpXq, and s, s1 P S satisfying the relevant
constraints. Denote by A1 and B1, A Y x and B Y x, respectively. Towards a contradiction, assume that
there exists some piA, ρA, P ∆pAq, piB , ρB , P ∆pAq, and α “ p0, 1q be such that,
px‹q´spiA „A px‹q´s1ρA, implying µApsq
µAps1q “
pρA ¨ uq
ppiA ¨ uq , (B.2)
px‹q´spiB „B px‹q´s1ρB , implying µBpsq
µBps1q “
pρB ¨ uq
ppiB ¨ uq , (B.3)
px‹q´spiAěA1px‹q´s1pαρA ` p1´ αqx‹q, implying µA1psq
µA1ps1q ě α
pρA ¨ uq
ppiA ¨ uq , (B.4)
px‹q´spiB ăB1 px‹q´s1pαρB ` p1´ αqx‹q, implying µB1psq
µA1ps1q ă α
pρB ¨ uq
ppiB ¨ uq (B.5)
Dividing the implications of (B.2) by (B.4) and (B.3) by (B.5), and applying Lemma 2, we get a direct
contradiction to (B.1).
Sufficiency. Assume IS holds. Let x P X, A,B PMpXq, and s, s1 P S satisfy the relevant constraints for
IS. Let M “ maxt µApsqµAps1q , µBpsqµBps1q , 1u. Finally, for any β P r0,M s, and s P S, let f˚ps, βq “ px‹q´sp βM x‹` p1´
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β
M qx‹q. Using (MBR), we have
UA
`
f˚ps, 1q˘ “ UA`f˚ps1, µApsq
µAps1q q
˘ “ µApsq
M
, and (B.6)
UB
`
f˚ps, 1q˘ “ UB`f˚ps1, µBpsq
µBps1q q
˘ “ µBpsq
M
. (B.7)
Let α “ µAps1qµA1 psqµApsqµA1 ps1q . Case: α ď 1. Applying (MBR) again delivers,
UA1
`
f˚ps, 1q˘ “ UA1`f˚ps1, α µApsq
µAps1q q
˘ “ µA1psq
M
.
By (B.6) and (B.7), we can apply IS, so,
UB1
`
f˚ps, 1q˘ “ UB1`f˚ps1, α µBpsq
µBps1q q
˘
. (B.8)
Expanding (B.8) according to (MBR):
µB1psq “ µB1ps1qµAps
1qµA1psq
µApsqµA1ps1q
µBpsq
µBps1q ,
which by Lemma 2, is equivalent to (B.1). In the case where α ą 1, consider f˚ps, 1α q and f˚ps1, µApsqµAps1q q, and
proceed in a similar manner. 
C Proofs
Proof of Theorem 2.2. Part (a), necessity. The necessity of EU, MC, UV are obvious from the inspection
of the representing functionals. CC follows from the continuity of µp¨q. Fix some tAnunPN with limit point
A. For each f P F‹, identify f “
`pα1x‹`p1´α1qx‹q, . . . , pα|S|x‹`p1´α|S|qx‹q˘ with fˆ “ pαs1 , . . . , αs|S|q.
So let f ěAn g for all n P N. Then, by the representation, we have, for every n,
EµAn pfˆ ´ gˆq ě 0. (C.1)
Since fˆ ´ gˆ is bounded and continuous, and since µAn converges to µA, we have EµApfˆ ´ gˆq ě 0. Appealing
again to the representation and the above identification delivers that f ěA g.
Part (a), sufficiency. It is a direct application of the expected utility theorem that EU delivers for each
A the existence of some continuous and bounded w : S ˆX Ñ R such that
UV NMA pfq “
ÿ
s
´
EfpsqpwAps, xqq
¯
,
represents ěA. Moreover, if wAps, xq and wˆAps, xq both represent ěA, then wAps, xq “ aAwˆAps, xq ` bApsq
where aA P R`` and bApsq P R for all s P S.18
By exploiting the degrees of freedom from the scalars bApsq, we can set wAps, x‹q “ 0, for all A and
all s P S. The resulting functionals are unique up to linear transformations. Note, this implies that for all
s P NA, wAps, ¨q is identically 0.
18For a reference using the same framework, see “NM Theorem” of Karni et al. (1983).
20 C Proofs
For each A PMpXq, let uAps, xq : pNAqc ˆAÑ R be the mapping
uA : ps, xq ÞÑ wAps, xq
wAps, x‹q ,
and µA P ∆ppEA YNqcq as the distribution defined by
µApsq “ wAps, x
‹qř
s wAps, x‹q
.
Notice, µA is well defined and has full support, since by the non-triviality of ěA, NA ‰ S, and for each
s P pEA YNqc, s P N cA (Lemma 1), and so by UV, wAps, x‹q ą wAps, x‹q “ 0. Define,
UMDA pfq “ EµA
´
EfpsqpuAps, xqq
¯
. (C.2)
Following standard algebraic manipulations, we can see µApsquAps, xq “ 1ř
s wAps,x‹qwAps, xq, and therefore
UMDA represents ěA.
Let D “  ps, xq P S ˆX | DA PMpXq, x P A, s R NA(. For each ps, xq P D, let As,x be any menu such
that x P As,x and s R NAs,x . Define the mapping u : D Ñ R as,
u : ps, xq ÞÑ uAs,xps, xq.
and extend u to S ˆX, by defining ups, xq “ 0 for all px, sq P Dc.
We now claim, for any A PMpXq, s R NA and x P A, we have ups, xq “ uAps, xq. Indeed, for every such
A,B PMpXq and s R NA YNB . Let ěA|B|s Ď p∆pAXBqq2 be defined by:
piěA|B|s ρ ðñ EpipuAps, xqq ě EρpuAps, xqq.
Since ěA|B|s is represented by a linear utility function, it satisfies EU, and so, by the expected utility
theorem, uAps, ¨q is the unique utility index, up to affine transformations.
Fix some A and s R NA, and x P A. By (C.2), EpipuAps, xqq ě EρpuAps, xqq holds if and only if, for all
f P FA, f´spiěA f´sρ. Applying MC, we immediately have g´spiěAs,x g´sρ for any g P FAs,x (here we use
the fact that s R NAs,x). From (C.2) again, ěA|As,x|s “ ěAs,x|A|s. So uAps, ¨q is an affine transformation of
uAs,xps, ¨q. Moreover, both are twice normalized: uAps, x‹q “ uAs,xps, x‹q “ 1 and uAps, x‹q “ uAs,xps, x‹q “
0. Thus, they must coincide on AXAs,x. Finally, since x P AXAs,x, we have uAps, xq “ uAs,xps, xq “ ups, xq.
Clearly, since uA “ u|A and uA is continuous and bounded, u|A is continuous and bounded.
Because it eases exposition, we well prove that µp¨q :MpXq Ñ ∆pSq is continuous after we have shown
that it is unique.
Part (b). Uniqueness results are standard. It is clear from the argument above that up¨, ¨q is unique (given
the normalization on ‹), as it must represent ěAs,x|As,x|s. With regards to beliefs, assume to the contrary,
for some A PMpXq, µ and ν both represent (in conjunction with u, as in (MBR)) ěA. Then there must
be some s, s1, such that µpsq ă νpsq and µps1q ą νps1q. Assume (with loss of generality, but the other case
follows from the reflected argument) that µpsq ď µps1q. Set pi as the probability distribution given by,
pipxq “
$’’’&’’’%
µpsq
µps1q if x “ x‹,
1´ µpsqµps1q if x “ x‹,
0 otherwise.
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Given that pµ, uq represents ěA, it follows from (MBR) that px‹q´s1pi „A px‹q´sx‹. But, since pν, uq also
represents ěA: px‹q´s1pi ăA px‹q´sx‹, a clear contradiction.
Part (a), sufficiency continued. Let An converge to A but assume that µAn does not converge to µA.
Then there must exist some (continuous and bounded) fˆ : S Ñ R, such that limEµAn pfˆq ‰ EµApfˆq. Set
β “ EµApfˆq. Since fˆ is bounded, it is without loss of generality that fpsq P p0, 1q, for all s P S. Partition
N into N` “ tn P N|EµAn pfˆq ą βu and N´ analogously. At least one of these sets that is infinite and the
corresponding subsequence constructed from the entries does not converge to β. WLOG, assume it is N`.
Let nk denote the corresponding subsequence. Since limEµAnk
pfˆq ‰ β and since EµAnk pfˆq ą β for all k,
there exists an  ą 0 such that we can extract a further subsequence (also labeled nk) with EµAnk pfˆq ą β` 
for all k.
Consider the act f which assigns fˆpsqx‹`p1´fˆpsqqx‹ to each state and the act g “ pβ`qx‹`p1´pβ`qqx‹
to each state (of course, we can choose an epsilon small enough to ensure pβ` q ă 1. By the representation,
and the above analysis, it is clear that f ěAnk g for all k, and so by CC, f ěA g, contradicting the fact that
UApfq “ β ă β `  “ UApgq.

Proof of Proposition 3.1. This follows directly from Lemma 1 of Shmaya and Yariv (2016) which states (in
the language of this paper) that given a prior µ and a set of posteriors tµAuAPMpXq one can find a generating
signal structure, that transforms µ into tµAuAPMpXq, so long as the prior beliefs lie in the relative interior
of the convex hull of the set of posteriors, i.e., µ P ripConvptµAuAPMpXqqq. Given the additional flexibility in
choosing the prior, and the fact the relative interior of a non-empty convex set is non-empty, we can always
find such a µ. 
Proof of Theorem 3.2. Necessity. Assume there exists some pµ, l,Xq, with lpx, sq P p0, 1q for all px, sq P
X ˆ S, that generates tµA|A P MpXqu. For some A that does not contain x and s, s1 P S, we have
eAps, s1q “ µApsqµAps1q , and eAYxps, s1q “ µAYxpsqµAYxps1q . Using (3.2), we have
µAYxpsq “
µApsq lpx,sq1´lpx,sq
EµA
´
lpx,s1q
1´lpx,s1q
¯
for all s P S. So,
eAYxps, s1q “
µApsq lpx,sq1´lpx,sq
µAps1q lpx,s1q1´lpx,s1q
,
“
lpx,sq
1´lpx,sq
lpx,s1q
1´lpx,s1q
eAps, s1q.
Hence the ratio of equalizers does not depend on the menu. By Lemma 3, IS holds.
Sufficiency. Assume IS holds. Let αpx, sq “ µt‹Yxupsqµ‹psq , set
lpx, sq “ αpx, sq
1` αpx, sq , (C.3)
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for all px, sq P Xz‹ˆS and lpx‹, ¨q ” lpx‹, ¨q ” 1. Let γpsq “ ś
xPXz‹
p1´ lpx, sqq. Define µ P ∆pSq by,
µpsq “
µ‹psq
γpsq
Eµ‹
´
1
γps1q
¯
By construction, µ‹ is generated according to (3.2).
We will now show that as defined, pµ, l,Xq generates the remainder of tµA|A PMpXqu. We proceed by
induction on the cardinality of A.
Define νx P ∆pSq
νxpsq “
µ‹psq lpx,sq1´lpx,sq
Eµ‹
´
lpx,s1q
1´lpx,s1q
¯
Now, using the algebraic identity
α
1`α
1´ α1`α “ α, we have
lpx,s1q
1´lpx,s1q “ αpx, sq “ µt‹Yxupsqµ‹psq . Therefore νxpsq “
µt‹Yxupsq. This completes the base case (for |A| “ 3).
Now assume that pµ, l,Xq generates tµA|A PMpXq, |A| ď nu. Fix any A with n elements, and x R A.
Let A1 denote AY x. Set,
νA1 “
µApsq lpx,sq1´lpx,sq
EµA
´
lpx,s1q
1´lpx,s1q
¯
Towards a contradiction, assume that uA1 ‰ νA1 . Therefore, there must exist some s such that uA1psq ą
νA1psq, and s1 such that uA1ps1q ă νA1ps1q. Therefore we have:
eAps, s1q
eAYxps, s1q “
µApsq
µAps1q
µA1 psq
µA1 ps1q
ă
µApsq
µAps1q
νA1 psq
νA1 ps1q
“
lpx,s1q
1´lpx,s1q
lpx,sq
1´lpx,sq
“ e‹ps, s
1q
e‹Yxps, s1q
Which, by Lemma 3 is a contradiction to IS. Therefore, the inductive step holds, and pµ, l,Xq generates
tµA|A PMpXqu. 
Proof of Theorem 3.3. Necessity. Assume there was some 9„ P S ˆ S and pµ, l,Xq, satisfying the relevant
assumptions, that generates tµA|A P MpXqu. Let A,B P MpXq such that pNAqc X pNBqc ‰ H. Let
s P pNAqc X pNBqc. Let E “ ts1 P S|s1 9„su. For all s1 P E,
µAps1q “
µps1qśxPA lpx, s1qśyRAp1´ lpy, s1qqř
s2PS µps2q
ś
xPA lpx, s2q
ś
yRAp1´ lpy, s2qq
“ µps
1qśxPA lpx, s1qśyRAp1´ lpy, s1qqř
s2PE µps2q
ś
xPA lpx, s2q
ś
yRAp1´ lpy, s2qq
“ µps
1qśxPA lpx, sqśyRAp1´ lpy, sqqř
s2PE µps2q
ś
xPA lpx, sq
ś
yRAp1´ lpy, sqq
“ µps
1q
µpEq .
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The first equality comes from property (ii) of partitional signal structures and the second comes from
property (i). By property (ii), for any s1 R E, µAps1q “ 0. Of course the exact same calculation can be
made for B, so, µA “ µB . Therefore the two menus induce the same preference. Further since for s1 R E,ś
xPA lpx, s1q
ś
yRAp1´ lpy, s1qq “ 0 it must be that for some x P A, lpx, s1q “ 0 or for some y R A, lpy, s1q “ 1.
Hence, PS is satisfied.
Sufficiency. Assume PS holds. By assumption N “ H, so, for each s P S, choose some menu Apsq such
that s R NApsq. Define 9„ over SˆS, by s 9„s1 if there exists some s2 such that s, s1 R NAps2q. It is obvious that
9„ is a equivalence relation. The choice of Apsq was irrelevant, since by PS, if s P NB , then the projections of
ěA and ěB onto F‹ must coincide and so µA “ µB , implying that NApsq “ NB . Let K denote the number
of partitions in S{ 9„.
Define µpsq “ µApsqpsqK . Recall, N pAq “ tB P MpXq|NB X NA ‰ Hu. For each s, let xpsq de-
note the dignified element (which exists by PS) for N pApsqq. For each pxpsq, sq let lpxpsq, sq “ 1 if
xpsq P Apsq and lpxpsq, sq “ 0 if xpsq R A. Define the rest of lpx, sq “ 12 . It is straightforward to see
that µApsq “ µps|ts P S|s R Apsquq. 
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